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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






CHUKWUEMEKA EZEKWO; IFEOMA EZEKWO, 





CHRISTOPHER QUIRK; MICHAEL CHRISTIANSEN; 
THORNTON WHITE; CITY OF ENGLEWOOD, NEW JERSEY 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-03167) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
______________ 
 
Argued: March 7, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges. 
 









                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.  
This case comes before us with an unusual posture. After sustaining injuries from 
an altercation with local law enforcement in Englewood, New Jersey, the plaintiffs in the 
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underlying matter appeared to enter into a settlement with the City. They later refused to 
follow the terms of the settlement, alleging that their counsel did not adequately convey 
the terms and therefore there had not been a meeting of the minds. Because of the unusual 
circumstances of this case, we will remand for the limited purpose of allowing the plaintiffs 
an opportunity to be heard before the District Court. 
I. 
We presume the parties’ familiarity with this case and set out only the facts needed 
for the discussion below. Appellants Chukwuemeka Ezekwo and Ifeoma Ezekwo were 
involved in a physical altercation with three City of Englewood police officers at 
Englewood Hospital in New Jersey, where they suffered serious injuries. Based on that 
altercation, the Ezekwos filed a complaint against the police officers and the City of 
Englewood alleging civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
The parties concluded settlement negotiations on March 30, 2017, when counsel for 
all parties jointly telephoned the District Court to report that they had reached a settlement. 
As part of that settlement agreement (the Agreement), the Ezekwos would receive a 
payment of $1,000,000 for agreeing to release all defendants from liability for the claims 
asserted in the complaint and for signing release forms to that effect. The Court entered an 
Order Administratively Terminating Action the next day. 
The Ezekwos did not sign the releases, and the City filed a Motion to Enforce 
Settlement. The Ezekwos filed a pro se opposition to the motion, in which they stated they 
had never seen the actual Agreement and would not agree to the terms as set out in the 
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releases. Further, they refused to enter into any settlement that did not include as a term the 
City’s agreement to prosecute the police officers named in their complaint. 
The Magistrate Judge, after receiving extensive motion practice on a range of issues 
and confirming with the Ezekwos that they desired to proceed pro se, scheduled an 
evidentiary hearing on November 6, 2017. Her order instructed both parties to file with the 
court all witnesses and exhibits upon which they intended to rely. At the hearing, the 
Ezekwos’ former counsel testified on behalf of the City, and it moved into evidence two 
emails—one each from counsel on each side—confirming the settlement amount and the 
Ezekwos’ approval. The Ezekwos, however, declined to testify. Instead, they requested the 
opportunity to return to testify once they obtained counsel. They also requested permission 
to submit documents after the hearing. Both requests were denied, and the evidentiary 
hearing was closed. 
The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) concluding 
that, absent contrary evidence from the Ezekwos, the City’s Motion to Enforce Settlement 
should be granted. After the District Court adopted the R&R, the Ezekwos filed counseled 
objections in accordance with Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They 
disputed, inter alia, the Magistrate Judge’s finding that there had been a meeting of the 
minds on all essential terms of the Agreement.1 They also requested an evidentiary hearing 
before the District Court. It declined to hold do so. Instead, in a well-reasoned order, the 
                                              
1 In their Rule 72 objections, the Ezekwos asserted that the Agreement excluded 
multiple non-monetary terms they had told counsel were essential to settlement, including 
a cease-and-desist provision, the retraction of a certain City press statement they believed 
to be false, and the prosecution of the police officers involved in the altercation. 
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Court addressed the Ezekwos’ objections and ultimately decided to maintain its adoption 
of the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. 
The Ezekwos now appeal that decision on substantive and procedural grounds. They 
believe the District Court erred by determining that there existed an enforceable settlement 
and abused its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing before ruling on their 
Rule 72 objections. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
III. 
We first discuss the issue of the evidentiary hearing, as its disposition bears on the 
other issue on appeal. Where a party files Rule 72 objections to an R&R, a district court is 
required to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified 
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
The court is not required to conduct a de novo evidentiary hearing as part of that 
determination. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 (1980) (exploring the 
legislative intent behind Section 636 and concluding that de novo hearings are not 
required). Rather, it may use its “sound judicial discretion” in making its determinations. 
Id. at 676, see also D.N.J. Local Civ. R. 72.1(c)(2) (A district judge “may consider the 
record developed before the Magistrate Judge, making his or her own determination on the 
basis of that record.”) We review the Court’s determinations in response to Rule 72 
objections for abuse of discretion. See Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 674.  
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Our review is tempered by the fact that the Ezekwos were not represented by counsel 
when challenging the Agreement before the Magistrate Judge. As a general matter, our 
Court “tend[s] to be flexible when applying procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially 
when interpreting their pleadings.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244 
(3d Cir. 2013). We recognize that the Ezekwos’ circumstances were by their own design, 
as they had multiple opportunities—even prompts—to obtain counsel and still did not do 
so. Regardless, our Court will not forego our traditional flexibility when reviewing the 
actions of pro se litigants. 
We are of the opinion that the District Court admirably fulfilled its duties under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 72. We take no issue with its response to the Ezekwos’ Rule 72 objections. 
However, the latitude that our Court grants to pro se litigants, coupled with the possibility 
of the Ezekwos’ testimony introducing a disputed issue of material fact, compel us to 
remand this case for the limited purpose of (1) allowing the Ezekwos one final chance to 
submit their testimony on the record and (2) allowing the City to cross-examine them on 
that testimony. 
We offer no opinion as to the existence of an enforceable settlement agreement. We 
leave that determination to the able District Court. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be vacated and 
the case will be remanded for the limited purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing on 
whether the parties formed an enforceable settlement agreement. 
 
